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Tail risk, defined as extreme event risk in asset markets, is an important consideration for 
investors when making investment decisions. This paper empirically tests the role of tail 
risk in international market. Using sample of 40 countries from 1980 to 2014, I show that 
tail risk positively predicts future market returns. Across all countries, stocks with high 
sensitivity to past global tail risk on average will earn higher returns than stocks with low 
sensitivity. In addition, I show that tail risk act as a global transmission channel of 







CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Tail risk, defined as extreme event risk in asset markets, is an important 
consideration for investors when making investment decisions. Recently, various 
theoretical models have incorporated the tail risk and shown that heavy-tailed shocks to 
economic fundamentals help explain asset pricing behavior (Rietz 1988; Barro 2006; 
Gabaix 2012; Gourio 2012; Wachter 2013; Bansal and Yaron 2004; Eraker and 
Shaliastovich 2008; Bansal and Shaliastovich 2010; Bansal and Shaliastovich 2011; 
Drechsler and Yaron 2011). Empirically, Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) find that the 
compensation for extreme events accounts for a large fraction of U.S. equity risk premium. 
Jiang and Kelly (2014) show that, in the US market, tail risk has predictive power for 
aggregate market returns and for cross-section of average asset returns. 
Most of the existing literature focuses on that U.S. market, and they find that 
investors are averse to tail risk and they require higher return to hold assets with high 
exposures to tail risk. However, no study examines tail risks in international financial 
markets. I believe understanding the role of tail risk is an important research question for 
the following three reasons. First, using multiple countries outside of U.S. evidently 
provides a natural out-of-sample test on whether tail risk is also significant in other 
countries, or whether tail risk is significant in countries with specific features, such as 
developed vs. emerging markets.   
 Second and more importantly, with global capital markets, I can connect the pricing 
of the tail risk to the issue of market integration.  The U.S. market is usually considered to 
be fully integrated with the global capital markets, but other countries might have different 
level of integration into the global financial market. Therefore, the importance of global 




markets, or regions. For investors in countries with high integration into the global financial 
market, such as developed markets, they might be concerned more about global tail risk, 
while local specific tail risk could have bigger impact than global tail risk in countries with 
low integration into the global financial market. Therefore, using global market makes it 
possible to investigate such cross-country or cross-regional variations, and provide 
excellent out-of-sample test outside of US. 
 Finally, extreme events are more likely to happen during crisis period, such as the 
financial crisis period in 2008. Presumably the tail risk might be extremely important 
during crisis period. The 2008 financial crisis is world-wide crisis, and it occured in 
multiple countries. With our global set up, we can readily examine how the crisis spreads 
out across countries, and whether the global tail risk or the local tail risk is an important 
channel for transmission of the crisis.  Tail risks could act as a potential channel helps 
explaining how the crisis spread violently across economic sectors and countries in the 
world, as contagion may be driven by he   	
   	
 
appetite/aversion beyond the effect of fundamentals (Bakeart, Ehrmann, Frtzscher, and 
Mehl (2014)).  
 In this paper, I examine the role of tail risks in international financial markets by 
using around 60 thousand stocks from 40 countries from January 1980 to December 2014. 
Tail risk is relevant for asset pricing, because it might correlate with state variables driving 
the stochastic discount actor through the impact of uncertainty shocks on real outcomes. 
Bloom (2009) argu             	  
     









       

adjustment costs. Hence, a common rise of tail risk across countries, indicating a higher 
likelihood of extreme events in the markets, will depress aggregate economic activity by 
inducing all firms to simultaneously reduce investment and hiring. Similarly, a rise in 

     
    	    
  	   
  
countries, especially countries with high integration into the global markets.  
 I define tail risk as extreme event risk in asset markets. There are three current 




data, one on high frequency return data, and the other on panel return data. Examples of 
the option-based approach include Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003), who study risk-
neutral skewness and kurtosis; Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), who examine how 
the variance risk premium relates to the equity premium; and Backus, Chernov, and Martin 
(2011) and Gao and Song (2013), who infer disaster risk premium from options. Tail 
estimate from high-frequency data is exemplified by Bollerslev and Todorov (2011). Panel 
estimation approach using daily return data is proposed by Jiang and Kelly (2014), who 
investigate the effects of time-varying extreme event risk in US market. All three 
approaches are powerful but the first two are subject to data limitations. The third approach 
can provide a time series of tail risk estimates as long as a large cross-section data is 
available, which allows me to construct tail risk estimates for most of the important stock 
markets around the world. 
 Following the third approach, I first construct tail risk estimates for each country 
using stocks daily return data, and examine the characteristics of tail risks. If people are 
tail risk averse and investment decisions are affected, tail risk should be able to predict 
future aggregate market return across all countries. To better distinguish the impact of tail 
risk from global part and local specific part in each country, I construct two more measures: 
the global tail risk and local specific tail risks. Global tail risk is computed as the value 
  	
     	      			 
of country tail risk with respect to global tail risk. I examine whether tail risks can forecast 
aggregate stock market returns using different types of tail risks constructed. Consistent 
with expectations that investors are averse to tail risk and investment decisions are affected 
by the level of tail risks, results of predictive regressions show that all tail risk measures 
can significantly and positively predict future market return in most of the countries, at the 
one month and one year horizons.  
 I also test whether assets that better hedge tail risk command a relatively high price 
and earn low expected returns. In each country, I form portfolios based sto  
to past tail risk, which are estimated using past 60 month rolling window. On average 




higher returns than portfolios with low sensitivity. I also employ a cross-sectional 
regression framework to investigate whether stocks with high sensitivity to tail risks earn 
higher return in the future, controlling for other risks Overall, across all countries or 
developed countries, stocks with higher sensitivity to global or local specific tail risk will 
earn significant higher return in the future, controlling for market, smb, hml, and mom risks. 
In addition, local specific tail risk appears to be more important than global tail risk in 
emerging countries, which have low integration into the global financial markets. 
 After showing that global tail risk is linked with global state variable, I then 
empirically examine the role of tail risk during a special time period   2007 to 2009 
financial crisis. The crisis started initially in a relatively small segment of the lending 
market in the United States, and then rapidly and violently spread across all economies in 
the world, both developed and developing, as well as across all economic sectors. During 
the crisis, equity markets worldwide are affected and the extreme events such as market 
crashes happen all over the world. Many countries experiencing even sharper equity market 
crashes than the United States. After the crisis, researchers try to understand how and why 
the crisis in a small sector in US has spread so violently and transformed into a global 
financial crisis. There are various papers suggesting the possible sources of contagion such 
as transmission through banking exposure channel (Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgano (2004), and Tong and Wei 
(2010, 2011)), banking policy channel (King (2009)), external exposure/segmentation 
channel (Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Briere, Chapelle, and Szafarz (2012), Fratzscher 
(2012)), information asymmetries channel (Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2009), 
and Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2011)), domestic macroeconomic fundamentals 
channel (Ahnert and Bertsch (2013)), and global/common risk and liquidity channel 
(Bekaert et al. (2011) and Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012)).  
 My hypothesis is that during the crisis, investors might become more concerned 
about tail risk as market crashes in multiple countries. Following Bakeart, Ehrmann, 









which investors are averse to, could act as a potential channel helps explaining how the 
crisis spread violently across economic sectors and countries in the world. As a result, 
  	 
 
	  during financial crisis becomes crucial to deepen our 
understanding about the 2008 global financial crisis.         
 

exposures are affected by tail risk during crisis time, suggesting investors shun away risky 
assets and fly to safety. In addition, after controlling the impact of tail risk, the presence of 
stock excessive co-movement becomes less significant, suggesting that tail risk is a 
possible source of contagion during the financial crisis though the global/common risk 
channel. 
 My findings contribute to several strands of literatures. Researchers have 
hypothesized that heavy-tailed shocks to economic fundamentals help explain certain asset 
pricing behavior that has proved otherwise difficult to reconcile with traditional macro-
finance theory. Examples include the Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) rare disaster 
hypothesis and its extensions to dynamic setting by Gabaix (2012), Gourio (2012), and 
 
    		      	  
   	-run risks model 
that incorporate fat-tailed endowment shocks (Eraker and Shaliastovich 2008; Bansal and 
Shaliastovich 2010, 2011; Drechsler and Yaron 2011). Using tail risk constructed using 
method from Jiang and Kelly (2014), mine is the first paper to directly document time-
varying tail risks worldwide, show global tail risk is linked with global state variable, and 
provide evidence consistent with two key equity premium implications from above models. 
In addition, using international sample helps better investigate tail risk and provide more 
comprehensive out-of-sample test than just examining US markets alone. It also helps to 
better understand the cross-country variation  	 
 !   
   
decisions, which depends on the level of integration of local market into the global financial 
market. Overall, I show that investors are tail risk averse, and increases in tail risk raise the 
return required by investors to hold the tail risky assets, such as aggregate market returns. 
I also show that tail risk affects future cross-section of expected returns. High tail risk is 
associated with bad states of the world and high marginal utility. Hence, assets that hedge 




tail risk. Consistent with expectations, stocks with high sensitivity to past tail risk earn 
significantly higher future return in most of the countries in my sample. 
 There is the vast literature on international market integration, shock transmission, 
and contagion (Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), and Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and 
Mehl (2014)). I add to the literature by examining role of tail risk during financial crisis 
and show that tail risk acts as one of the sources of contagion during the period. My work 
also relates the growing literature on the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. This 
includes articles focusing on the drivers of the transmission of the crisis across firms and 
markets within the United States, such as Tong and Wei (2010), Almeida et al. (2012), and 
Diebold and Yilmax (2010), or articles taking a more macroeconomic perspective such as 
Eichengreen et al. (2012). 
 The findings of this paper also have important implications for international 
investment and portfolio diversification. In the traditional capital asset pricing model, any 
systematic fluctuation of asset prices is captured solely by market risk. Therefore, the 
covariance of stocks returns with global market returns is the key to the success of 
international portfolio diversification. However, the findings in this paper show that the 
tail risk also systematically affects asset prices, and is a potential state variable. Hence, 
investors should take tail risk into consideration when they seek to diversify away risks in 
global financial markets. The significant pricing of global tail risk in developed and open 
countries implies the importance of global investors and the relatively high degree of 
financial market integration in such countries. Supporting this view, Chan, Covrig, and Ng 
(2005) show that countries with these properties attract more global investors. The finding 
indicates that stocks that perform well when tail risk is high are appreciated by global 
investors as tail risk is an important concern, especially when investors rebalance their 
portfolios globally in the face of high likelihood of market wide extremes. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 presents the empirical 
framework and hypotheses. Section 3 briefly introduces the tail risk measure used in the 
paper, describes the data and the sample construction procedure. Section 4 provides 




Section 5 tests whether tail risk acts as a possible source of contagion during financial crisis. 




CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the main assumption in the paper and empirical approach 
used to test the hypothesis. In this paper, the risk factors considered are well-known and 
well-studied risk factors such as market factor in CAPM, small-minus-big (SMB) and high-
minus-low (HML) factors in Fama-French factors model (Fama and French 1993), and 
momentum (MOM) factor. 
Tail risk, constructed each month using daily returns in each country following 
Jiang and   	
     -varying component of return 
        eys the power law probability distribution. 









01# ,     (1) 
, where 20  ! is the kth daily return that falls below an extreme value threshold 3 ! during 
month t in country i, and 4 ! is the total number of such exceedances within month t in 
country i. The threshold 3 ! is chosen by the econometrician and defines where the center 
of the distribution ends and the tail begins. It represents a suitably extreme quantile such 
that any returns below this cutoff are assumed to obey the specified tail distribution. 
Following Jiang and Kelly (2014), here I define 3 ! as the fifith percentile of the cross-
section each month in each country.  
After constructing tail risk for each country at each month, I construct global and 
local specific tail risks following Bekeart, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) in order to better 
distinguish the effect of tail risk between global part and local specific part. The global tail 










 , in which    !"#$% & '( )# #*( #+ 
Correspondingly, the local specific tail risk for each country i at time t, , , is 
estimated from the following regression using whole sample observations:   - .
/  . ,. As a result, , captures the orthogonal/residual component in 
country tail risk estimate with respect to global tail risk at each time t. Similarly, I construct 
country market factors, and SMB/HML/MOM factors following method described on 
0$("1& 2(3#(4 )"5 #1(" construct the global factor as the value weighted average of the 
 !"#$(& 6)# $+ 
2.1 Tail Risk in International Financial Markets 
The main assumption I have is that investors& *)$7")8 !#8#%  "$()"7 " #)8
risk. As a result, the stochastic discount factor is also increasing in tail risk. This 
assumption has two testable implications. The first implication is related to time series 
equity premium time series. As investors are tail risk averse, an increase in tail risk will 
increase the return required by investors to hold any tail risky assets. To test this, I estimate 
a simple regression of market return on tail risk, as stock market as a whole is subject to its 
tail risk, like any other assets:  
9:;  - . /< . =,     (2) 
in which < is tail risk estimated from (1) for country i at time t-1, and 9:; is 
market return for country i at time t. In the predictive regressions (2) I use next one month 
or one year market return as dependent variable. All the observations used in the regression 
are at monthly frequency. To address the overlapping estimation window problem in the 
predictive regression, I adjusted statistical inferences using Newey-West standard error 
correction with lag equal to 1 or 12, respectively.  To be consistent with my assumption, 
coefficient estimate on tail risk, />, in (2) should be positive and significant. 
As different countries have different level of integration into the global market, 
investors can be more sensitive to global tail risks in some countries, while investors in 




and open market like Singapore, which is highly integrated into global market, investors 
might invest mainly in global portfolios, thus are more sensitive to global tail risk. On the 
other hand, in closed market which lowly integrates with global market, investors might 
hold portfolios mainly contain local assets, thus are more sensitive to local specific tail risk. 
Overall, investors would demand different returns to hold portfolios with different 
exposure to global or local specific tail risk. In order to test this hypothesis, I construct 
global tail risk,  , and local specific tail risk, 	, based on g country tail risk, 
	,and estimate the following regression: 

	       	,     (3) 
and,   

	       	  	,   (4) 
in which   is global tail risk at time t-1, constructed as the value weighted average 
   ! "   # -1. 	 is local specific tail risk for country i at time 
t-1, which is the orthogonal component in country tail risk estimate with respect to global 
tail risk. Similarly, as investors are averse to tail risk, I expect coefficient estimate on tail 
risks, $ and %, in (3), and (4) should be positive and significant. 
The second implication is related to cross-sectional stock returns. If global tail risk 
is a potential global state variable and it affects investment decisions as investors are averse 
to it, assets with better hedge to tail risk would be priced higher and have lower expected 
returns. There are two ways to test this. First the implication can be by comparing average 
returns of assets to their estimated tail risk sensitivities. In details, I sort stocks based on 
their sensitivity to tail risk and compare returns between high and low sensitivity groups. 
The tail risk sensitivities of individual stocks are estimated with regression of the form: 




where   is the monthly return for stock j in country i at time t, 	
 is global tail 
risk at time t-1, and 	
  is local specific tail risk for country i at time t-1. The 
regression is conducted each month using past 60 months observations. 
In line with the intuition behind aggregate tail risk regressions, I expect that stocks 
with high values of  are those that most sensitive to tail risk in country j, and are deeply 
discounted when tail risk is high and have high expected returns going forward. On the 
other hand, stocks with low or negative are good tail risk hedges because, when tail risk 
rises, their prices rise contemporaneously, and their expected future returns fall. Overall, I 
expect that stocks in the high sensitivity group should on average earn higher returns than 
stocks in low sensitivity group. 
Another way to test the second implication employs the cross-sectional regression 
framework. In details, I conduct the Fama-Macbeth regression each month across all 
countries, developed/emerging markets, or five different regions: 
            
 
 !"##$  %  (6) 
in which  and  are loadings on global and local specific tail risks for stock j 
in country i at time t estimated from rolling window regression (5).   
  is 
control variable for stock j in country i at time t-1. In the regression, the control variables 
used are market, SMB, HML, and MOM betas, which are also estimated using past 60 
months rolling window. !"##$ is the dummy variable for country i. I expect & to 
be positive and significant in countries that are highly integrated with world financial 
market, and I expect that & to be positive and significant in countries that are lowly 
integrated with world financial market. 
2.2 Tail Risk during Financial Crisis 
After investigating '()* +),-., )/0(1' 23 (,,4' 0+)14, )3 international financial 




period   2007 to 2009 financial crisis, during which investors are particularly concerned 
about tail risk as market crashes in multiple countries.  
Mounting evidence suggests that international asset prices are sensitive to measures 
of risk aversions (Bekaert et al. (2011), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012)). Following the 
setting in Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014), 	
 risk aversion may 
substantially increase during the crisis, making them shun risky assets and flee into safer 
assets. As investors are averse to tail risks, it is possible that tail risks  	

investment decisions during the period. In order to test this, I formulate an international 
factor model with 4 kinds of factors: global market, SMB, HML, and MOM factors. The 
full model is the following: 
         ,      (7) 
     !"#  $% !"#  &,    (8) 
&  &  & !"#  &$% !"#,      (9) 
     !"#  $% !"#,               (10) 
, where  is monthly excess return for asset j in country i at time t (i.e. the return minus 
the three-month US T-bill rate in monthly unit).  is a vector of the factors (i.e. global 
market factor, etc).  is a crisis dummy at time t. It equals 1 if time t is in the crisis. 
 !"  and % !"  are global and local specific tail risk variables that is designed to 
capture time and cross-sectional variation in factor exposure. 
I test two models: world CAPM and four factors models when using either only 
global market factor or four factors (global market, SMB, HML, and MOM factors). 
Following naming convention in Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzsher, Mehl (2014), the 
'( )*+,  - .++ )*+ /-re everything is included. When  is excluded 
	) - )*+ 	 ++ )0 1 		    - '	*2* )*+,3 4*	 - .++
hypothesis, the co-movement between various stocks is determined by the factor exposures 




interdependence model can potentially fit the observed increase in correlations during the 
crisis through an increase in factor volatilities. The model works because the correlation 
between a stock return and a factor is the beta with respect to the factor, times the ratio of 
    	
    	   	 	    
As volatilities tend to dramatically increase during crises, increased correlations are thus 
not necessarily indicative of contagion (Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). 
In the contagion model,  in equation (9) and (10) captures contagion unrelated to 
the observable factors  of the model. If  is substantially significant for a set of stocks, 
then these stocks show excess co-movement during the crisis. On the other hand,  in 
equation (9) and (10) captures contagion related to the observable factors of the model 
during crisis. In this paper, I used global and local specific tail risk as a potential channel 
and test whether risk aversion to tail risk can help to explain the contagion during financial 
crisis. If tail risk is a potential channel of contagion during crisis, then we should observe 
the following: first,  and  are significant in contagion model; second, the excessive co-
movement among model residuals are less significant in the contagion model than 
interdependence model as a well-specified model should render all correlations between 
the residuals of the regression negligible; third, contagion model should be able to predict 




CHAPTER 3: DATA 
Daily returns are calculated using a daily total return index, which is adjusted for 
stock splits and dividend payments, from Datastream for all available stocks from 45 
countries for the period of January 1980 to December 2014. US stock market daily and 
monthly data are obtained from CRSP and Compustat during the sample period. According 
to the MSCI, there are 23 developed-market and 23 emerging-market countries. The initial 
sample covers 62552 stocks from 46 countries. 
To build a reliable sample, I applied the following screening procedures following 
to those in Lee (2011) and Hou, Karoyli, and Kho (2011). For a stock to be included in the 
sample, it should have positive market capitalization data, as well as positive shares 
outstanding and stock price, in US dollars at the end of previous month. I select only stocks 
from major exchanges, which are defined as those in which the majority of stocks for a 
given country are traded. Most countries in the sample have a single major exchange except 
for China (Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges), Germany (Frankfurt stock exchange 
and Xetra), Japan (Osaka and Tokyo stock exchanges), and the US (Amex, NYSE, and 
Nasdaq). I include only common stocks by excluding stocks with special features. First I 
exclude stocks with Datastream defined type as American Depositary Receipt, Closed-End 
Fund, Exchange-Traded Fund, Genussschein (Profit Participation Certificate), Global 
Depositary Receipt, Non-voting Depository Receipt, Preference Share, Warrant. In 
addition, I exclude stocks with special features by examining the names of the securities. 
Examples of such name filters are as follows. I extracted stocks with names including 
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represent real estate investment trusts, global depository receipts, or preferred stocks. In 
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removed because they are convertible into series A and B shares, respectively, after one 
year. In France, ADP and CIP type of stocks are dropped because they carry no voting 
rights but carry prefenrential dividend rights. In Germany, GSH type of shares is excluded 
because they offer fixed dividends and no voting rights. In Italy, RSP shares are dropped 
due to their nonvoting provisions. For US stocks, I only include stock with share code 10 
or 11. To avoid survivorship bias, I retain all data for dead stocks in the sample and exclude 
stock observations after the dead date provided by Datastream. 
The monthly sample is constructed based on daily data after implementation of all 
these screens described above. The proxy for tail risk is calculated following method in 
Jiang and Kelly (2014), which calculated using lower 5% daily return data in each month 
for each country. To make sure that a country has sufficient cross-sectional distribution of 
daily data to construct tail risk estimates, I require that a country should have at least 100 
stocks with daily returns available in a month to be included in the sample from 1980-2014. 
In addition, a country has to have more than 60 month of tail risk estimates to be included 
in the sample. As a result, my final sample contains 64799 firms from 40 countries. I use 
the 30-day US Treasury bill as a risk-free asset, which   #
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name, market development, and the region group that a country belongs to. Next 2 columns 
report the beginning year of coverage, and number of firms included in the sample for each 
country. The total number of stocks in the sample is 64799. Country US, which is a 
developed country in North America, contains the most number of firms across all 
countries, while country Austria contains the least. The number of stocks in each country 
varies across years. During the sample period, the country with largest number of stocks in 
the sample is the US (7406 firms in 1998), and the country with smallest number of stocks 
is Mexico (101 firms in 1992). The starting year of sample coverage also varies across 
countries. Egypt, which has the shortest sample period, has data beginning with 1999, while 




Table 1 show the time series average of cross-sectional monthly median return, size, and 
book to market ratio in each country. The returns are all calculated using total return index 
denominated in US dollar. The time series average of cross-sectional median varies a lot 
across different countries, with monthly return ranging from -0.60% in India to 0.37% in 
China, firm size ranging from 2.13 Million in India to 301.09 Million in Spain, and book 
to market ratio ranging from 0.34 in China to 1.62 in Russia. 
Figure 1 plot the time series of global tail risk and tail risk estimated for United 
States. In the graph, global and US tail risks appear to fluctuate together. During the 
technology boom, both globally and US tail risks retreat sharply but briefly, then rising to 











 Tail risk is 
constructed each month using daily returns in each country using equation (1), following 
Jiang and   
	, and it captures the common time-varying component of 
return tails. The global tail risk, GTail, is calculated as the value weighted average of 
country tail risks. The local specific tail risk, LTail, is the orthogonal component in country 
tail risk estimate with respect to global tail risk. Across all countries, France and India have 
tail risk estimates with highest AR(1) coefficient: 0.9, and tail risk estimate in China has 
lowest AR(1) coefficient: 0.2. Third to fifth columns in table 2 reports time series mean, 
standard deviation, and median of tail risks in each country. Russia, with mean of tail risk 
equal to 1.16, appears to have one of the highest tail risks on average across time in all 
countries. It also has one of the highest standard deviation and median of tail risks across 
countries. This is not surprising as Russia experienced a dramatic change in early 90s and 
its investment environment has not been in a stable state in a long time ever since. 
The last 2 columns in Table 2 report the correlation coefficient between country tail 





significantly correlate with global tails at 5%. Most developed co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22 developed countries, 12 countries have correlation above 0.5 with global tails, whereas 




CHAPTER 4:    	
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I assume that investors are also averse to tail risk and their marginal utility increases 
with tail risk. A high tail risk increases the return required by investors to hold any tail 
risky portfolios in the future, such as market portfolio. Empirical I test whether tail risk 
positively predicts future market return. In addition, assets that better hedge tail risk will 
command a relatively high price and earn low expected returns as investors require lowers 
returns to hold assets that are less sensitive to tail risk. I tested this implication by 
comparing average returns of assets to their estimated tail risk sensitivities cross-
sectionally and by using Fama-Macbeth approach. 
4.1 Tail risk and stock market returns 
If investors are tail risk averse, a high tail risk postpones investment decisions and 
increases the return required by investors to hold any assets that are subject to tail risk in 
the future, even market portfolio. As a result, I expect tail risk should be able to positively 
predict future market return across countries. I test whether tail risk positively predicts 
future market return by estimating the predictive regression (2), 
      ,     (2) 
in which  is tail risk estimated from (1) for country i at time t-1, and  is 
market return for country i at time t. In the regression I use next one month or one year 
market return as dependent variables.  
As different countries have different level of integration into the global market, as 
well as development, market quality, and macro conditions, investors can be sensitive to 
global tail risks in some countries, while investors in other countries can be more sensitive 




demand different returns to hold portfolios with different exposure to global or local 
specific tail risk. In order to test this hypothesis, I first construct global tail risk   as 
	 
	 		 
		  	    	 , and local specific tail risk 
 as the orthogonal component in country tail risk estimate with respect to global 
tail risk. Then I use global and local specific tail risk in the following predictive regressions 
(3) and (4): 
  ! " # $ %& # ',     (3) 
and,   
  ! " # $ %& # (%& # ',   (4) 
in which  %& is global tail risk at time t-1, and %& is local specific tail risk for 
country i at time t-1. I adjust statistical inferences using Newey-West standard error 
correction for the overlapping data in regression (2), (3) and (4).   
Table 3 reports the regression results for (2), (3), and (4). Panel A and B report the 
equally weighted coefficient estimates, $, when predicting next one month or one year 
return, across all countries, or countries in different markets and regions. Global tail always 
significantly and positively predict next one month returns across all countries, in 
developed and emerging markets, and in different regions. On the other hand, local specific 
tail can only significantly predict next one month return in Africa, which contains Egypt 
and South Africa and they all have relatively low integration into global financial market. 
When predicting next one year market returns, the significances of global and local tails 
	  		  	 	 	  ) 	* + 	,-	. global tail is 
significant in both developed and emerging countries, while local specific tail is only 
significant in emerging countries, which has relatively low integration into the global 
market.  
In summary, regression results of (2) / (4) presented in Table 3 are consistent with 
my expectations that global tail risk can predict future market returns. In countries with 




countries that are highly integrated. Overall, investors dynamically adjust their investment 
decisions and discount rates in response to global and local specific tail risks. 
4.2 Tail risk and cross-section of expected stock returns 
I next test whether global tail risk helps explain differences in expected returns 
across stocks. If investors are averse to tail risk, stocks with high loadings on tail risk will 
be discounted more steeply and thus have higher expected returns going forward. On the 
other hand, stocks with low or negative tail risk loadings serve as effective hedges and 
therefore will have comparatively higher prices and lower expected returns. 
4.2.1 Tail risk and cross-section of expected stock returns - Portfolios 
I test above implication through two approaches, first by comparing average returns 
of assets to their estimated tail risk sensitivities. In details, I sort stocks based on their 
sensitivity to tail risk and compare returns between high and low sensitivity groups. The 
tail risk sensitivities of individual stocks are estimated with regression (5): 
     	
    ,     (5) 
where   is the monthly return for stock j in country i at time t, 
 is global tail 
risk at time t-1, and  is local specific tail risk for country i at time t-1. To avoid 
look-ahead bias, I use rolling window of 60 months to obtain a time series of betas for each 
stocks. This 5-year rolling window starts at either January 1980 or the first month in which 
stocks are present in the sample. The window rolls forward at monthly interval. A stock 
should have at least 36 monthly returns within the 5 year window in order to estimate its 
betas.  
Stocks are then sorted into 10 portfolios in each country based on their estimated 
global tail risk loadings. For each month I long portfolios with highest tail risk loadings 
and short portfolios with lowest tail risk loadings and track average monthly equally-
weighted portfolio returns of this long-short strategy in a one-month post-formation 
window. Portfolio returns are out-of sample, as there is no overlap between data used for 




Table 4 reports the equally weighted monthly long-short portfolio returns across all 
countries, or in different markets, or in different regions. On average across all countries, 
stocks in the highest global tail risk loading portfolios earn equally-weighted average 
monthly returns 0.18% higher than stocks in the lowest portfolio, with a t-statistics of 3.90. 
After adjusting returns for market, SMB, HML, and MOM risks, the monthly return spread 
is 0.09% with t-statistics of 2.14.  Comparing developed markets and emerging markets, 
return difference between stocks in the highest and lowest global tail risk loading portfolios 
is only significant in developed market but not in emerging markets. This is not surprising 
as emerging markets are in general has lower integration into the global financial market, 
thus investors might be less concerned about global tail risk compare to investors in the 
developed countries.  
4.2.2 Tail risk and cross-section of expected stock returns   Cross-sectional 
regressions 
Previous results provide some evidence that that global tail risk helps to predict 
cross-sectional differences in expected returns.  	
 	
 	  	
 
both global and local specific tail risks on cross-sectional stock returns. Therefore, I employ 
cross-sectional regressions and include both global and local specific tail risks to better 
investigate impact of both tail risks on cross-sectional stock returns. 
In the regressions, I use individual stocks as test assets because an analysis at the 
level of individual stocks provides the following benefits. First, it helps to avoid potentially 
spurious results that could arise when characteristic-based portfolios are used as test assets 
(Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Berk (2000)). Second, potential loss of 
information contained in each stock can be minimized by performing empirical tests at the 
level of individual stock. Third, a stock-level analysis could increase the power of the test 
by providing ample observations for empirical tests. On the cost side, the loading estimated 
at the level of individual stock generally have a higher level of noise than those estimated 




The individual stock global and local specific tail risk betas,    and  , are 
estimated from previously mentioned equation (5) using rolling window of 60 month. 
Similarly, I also 	
  	ket, SMB, HML, and MOM betas.  
The sample period is relatively short in some countries, especially most of emerging 
countries. In addition, unlike the case of US, the quality of data from other countries is not 
guaranteed (Ince, and Porter (2006), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007)). Given these 
potential problems, I preform the cross-sectional regressions across all countries, 
developed or emerging markets, or across countries in different regions. As the regression 
is performed within more than one country, I run regression at each month with country 
dummy variables to provide an interpretation of the coefficient estimates in terms of 
within-country effects and to control for unknown country-specific effects (McLean, 
Pontiff, and Watanabe (2009)): 
       !"  # $%&'(&)$ $ 
# *+,,-  .  (6) 
in which    and "  are loadings on global and local specific tail risks for stock j 
in country i at time t-1 estimated from rolling window regression (5). %&'(&)$  is 
control variable for stock j in country i at time t-1, such as market, SMB, HML, and MOM 
betas. 
The first two rows in table 5 reports the time series averages of / and /! 
across all countries. No matter what control variable is included in the regression, stocks 
that are more sensitive to global tail risk consistently and significantly earn higher return 
on average across all countries. In addition, stocks that are more sensitive to local specific 
tail risk also significantly earn higher return in the future as well. The next third to 
fourteenth rows in table 5 reports the time series averages of / and /! across 
developed markets, emerging markets, or different regions. In developed markets, stocks 
with either higher loadings on global or local specific tail risk will have higher returns in 
the future. On the other hand, in emerging markets, only local specific tail risk is significant 




consistent with the results from table 3, that investors in emerging countries might be more 
concerned about local instead of global tail risks due to the low integration into the global 
financial markets. 
In different geographic regions, global tail risk significantly helps to explain 
expected return differences in Asia Pacific and North America, and marginally 
significantly helps to explain in Europe. On the other hand, local specific tail risk is 
significant in North America and South America, and marginally significant in Africa. 
Overall, consistent with expectations, results from table 4 and 5 suggest that tail 
risks helps to explain cross-sectional return differences. As investors are tail risk averse, 
stocks with high loadings on tail risk will be discounted more steeply and thus have higher 




CHAPTER 5: TAIL RISK AS CONTAGION CHANNEL DURING FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
In previous section, I show that tail risks affect asset prices. In this section, I will 
proceed to empirically examine the role of tail risk during a special time period   2007 to 
2009 financial crisis, during which extreme events tend to happen in multiple countries.  
Following Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014), during crisis time, 
investors shun risky assets and flee into safer assets when their risk aversions substantially 
increase. Therefore, investors  	
  be influenced by level of risks, such as 
tail risks as during crisis time extreme events tend to happen more frequently. As a result, 
it is important to examine the role of tail risk in 	
 risk aversions. In addition, I also 
investigate whether tail risk serves as a possible contagion channel during the financial 
crisis in this section. 
Similar to Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Mehl (2014), I formulate the international 
factor model with 4 kinds of factors: global market factor, SMB, HML, and MOM. The 
full model is described in section 1 equation (7) - (10): 
        ,      (7) 
     !"#$  %& !"#$  ',    (8) 
'  '  ' !"#$  '%& !"#$,      (9) 
     !"#$  %& !"#$,               (10) 
, where ()*+ is monthly excess return for asset j in country i at time t (i.e. the return minus 
the three-month US T-bill rate in monthly unit). ,-+ is a crisis dummy at time t. It equals 




that is designed to capture time and cross-sectional variation in factor exposure. I test two 
factors models using above regressions framework: world CAPM (   	
	) and 





Following naming convention in Bakaert, Ehrmann, Fratzsher, Mehl (2014), the 
  !" # $ %&!!  ! '$ (  ) (*$ # !& + ,hen -. is excluded 
from the model for all time, it is refered # $  ( /    !"+ 0 ( $ &!!
hypothesis, the co-movement between various stocks is determined by the factor exposures 
and the variance-covariance matrix of the factors. As the factors are orthogonal, 
interdependence model can potentially fit the observed increase in correlations during the 
crisis through an increase in factor volatilities. The model works because the correlation 
between a stock return and a factor is the beta with respect to the factor, times the ratio of 
%(  #1 ( &( )!!*2 '$$  3 #$'  3 ( #  %(4# )!!*+
As volatilities tend to dramatically increase during crises, increased correlations are thus 
not necessarily indicative of contagion (Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). 
I examine tail risks $ !/#   5/! '* /( % $ #1#4  5 ##) -
movement during the crisis. I use the test statistics 678698 from the setting in Bakaert, 




















      (13) 
 in which GH=> is the model residual estimated from (7)-(10) for asset j in country i at time 
t. ECTEST follows chi-square 1 distribution under the null hypothesis that there is no 
excessive co-movement among the residuals. The overall sample contains over 6000 stocks, 
making it very time consuming to calculate6:7;<. In order to make computation, I form 




loadings estimated from (5) into three groups in each country, and use the portfolios created 
as test assets to estimate model (7)-(10) and    accordingly. 
In the contagion model,  in equation (9) and (10) captures contagion unrelated to 
the observable factors  of the model. If  is substantially significant for a set of stocks, 
then these stocks show excess co-movement during the crisis. On the other hand,  in 
equation (9) and (10) captures contagion related to the observable factors of the model 
during crisis. If tail risks are potential channels of contagion during crisis, then we should 
observe the following: first,   and   are significant in contagion model; second, the 
excessive co-movement among model residuals are less significant in the contagion model 
than interdependence model as a well-specified model should render all correlations 
between the residuals of the regression negligible; third, contagion model should be able 
to predict stock returns during crisis time better than other two models. 
Table 6 reports the model estimation results for interdependence model, and 
contagion model (full model), as well as    for each model. Panel A reports the 








market risk during the financial crisis, with t-statistics of -9.17 and -4.85.    in the 
contagion model is significant, but this might be just a result of lacking of risk factors in 
the model.    
	    
  
 
 !" and MOM 
significantly, and HML marginally significantly during crisis, while local specific tail risk 
affects exposure to market significantly. In addition,    is 5.87 in interdependence 
model and 1.91 in contagion model. Therefore, there is significant excessive co-movement 
among residuals in the interdependence model but not in the contagion model.  
What would the model predict for the crisis? If the model correctly specified, the 
factor exposures are sufficient to predict the relative vulnerability across the different 
stocks across different countries during the financial crisis. Table 7 reports the how well 
the interdependence model, and contagion model can predict stock return performance 
during financial crisis across countries. The first column in Table 7 reports the equally-




average across all countries, the deviation of contagion model is always much smaller than 
the interdependence model, regardless of what factors used in the model. In addition, the 
deviation is always smaller in contagion model in all countries when four factors are used. 
When only market factor is used, the deviation is also smaller in contagion model in most 
of the countries, except Sweden, Taiwan, and Thailand, but the difference is small. 
In summary, results from table 6 and table 7 suggest that global and local specific 
   	
  	   		   	 
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excessive co-movement after controlling for tail risks, and the contagion model that 
incorporates impact of global and local tail risks during crisis can fit stock returns 
internationally better during crisis. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with three 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This paper empirically investigate impact of tail risks on international asset prices, 
using a large sample of assets covering 64799 stocks from 40 countries around the world 
during the period of Jan 1980 to Dec 2014. 
The empirical evidence presented in the paper is supportive that investors are tail 
risk averse. Global and local specific tail risks have predictive power for future market 
returns on average across all countries. Both tail risks have substantial explanatory power 
for the cross-sectional stock returns differences as investors require higher return to hold 
stocks that are not a good hedge to tail risk when tail risk is high. Comparing among tail 
risks, global tail risk appears to be more important in countries with high integrations into 
the global financial market such as developed countries, while local specific tail risk is 
more important in countries with low integrations such as emerging countries. 
These findings imply that tail risk is linked with state variable that drives stochastic 
discount factors. Therefore, the findings have implications for international portfolio 
diversification, because tail risk is another dimension to consider in addition to traditional 
risks. 
In this paper, I also try to understand whether tail risk acts as a possible global 
transmission channel of the crisis in equity markets. I find evidence of tail risk as a source 
of contagion, and after controlling for tail risks, the presence of stock excessive co-
movement diminishes. This finding sheds some lights on the importance of possible 













Table 1.Summary Statistics  
This table provides summary statistics of data coverage of 40 countries in the sample from 
1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. Column "Type" reports whether the country is classified by 
MSCI as developed (D) or emerging (E). Column "Region Group" reports the region group 
of the country. Column "Start" reports the start year of coverage for each country. Column 
"N(firm)" reports the number of firms included in the sample for each country. Column 
"Return", "Size", and "BM" report the time series mean of cross-sectional median monthly 
return, size, and book to market ratio for each country, respectively. The returns are all 





Country Type Region Group Start N(firm) Return Size BM 
Australia D Asia Pacific 1980 3260 0.04% 29.87 0.74 
Austria D Europe 1992 233 -0.01% 82.76 0.76 
Belgium D Europe 1986 358 0.18% 47.86 0.79 
Canada D North America 1980 3003 -0.09% 27.51 0.7 
Denmark D Europe 1988 381 0.01% 46.48 0.87 
Finland D Europe 1994 236 0.11% 100.98 0.66 
France D Europe 1980 2213 0.28% 89.56 0.75 
Germany D Europe 1980 1506 -0.01% 118.99 0.6 
Hong Kong D Asia Pacific 1985 1661 -0.31% 84.82 1.01 
Israel D Europe 1986 878 -0.15% 21.62 0.77 
Italy D Europe 1986 624 -0.28% 168.94 0.76 
Japan D Asia Pacific 1980 3610 0.08% 268.09 0.78 
Netherlands D Europe 1980 405 0.16% 44.24 0.84 
New Zealand D Asia Pacific 1988 335 0.18% 24.89 0.74 
Norway D Europe 1985 579 0.00% 55.48 0.78 
Portugal D Europe 1990 221 -0.05% 18.06 0.95 
Singapore D Asia Pacific 1984 796 0.15% 83.6 0.9 
Spain D Europe 1989 351 -0.04% 301.78 0.7 
Sweden D Europe 1984 1041 0.15% 42.08 0.6 
Switzerland D Europe 1983 428 0.32% 199.09 0.7 
UK D Europe 1980 6082 -0.08% 24.92 0.67 
US D North America 1980 18967 0.10% 174.3 0.58 
Brazil E South America 1997 295 -0.32% 326.85 0.58 
Chile E South America 1989 316 0.20% 85.87 0.79 
China E Asia Pacific 1993 2626 0.37% 324.67 0.34 
Czech Republic E Europe 1994 277 -0.12% 2.49 1.16 
Egypt E Africa 1999 470 -0.56% 15.91 0.79 
Greece E Europe 1991 414 -0.45% 48.82 0.91 
India E Asia Pacific 1990 3493 -0.60% 2.13 1.2 
Korea E Asia Pacific 1984 2723 -0.25% 42.1 1.1 
Malaysia E Asia Pacific 1986 1081 0.09% 63.6 0.94 
Mexico E North America 1992 273 -0.45% 131.03 0.82 
Peru E South America 1994 301 -0.12% 9.5 0.98 
Philippines E Asia Pacific 1993 301 -0.58% 46.73 0.98 
Poland E Europe 1998 1007 -0.45% 23.41 0.84 
Russia E Europe 1998 742 -0.07% 48.39 1.62 
South Africa E Africa 1990 962 -0.40% 43.5 0.69 
Taiwan E Asia Pacific 1989 1017 -0.51% 198.38 0.69 
Thailand E Asia Pacific 1988 857 -0.16% 41.44 0.86 




Table 2. Summary Statistics of Country Tail Risk Estimates 
This table provides summary statistics of tail estimates for 40 countries in the sample from 
1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. Column "AR(1)" reports the AR(1) coefficient of the tail 
estimates for each country. Column "Mean" reports the time series average of tail estimates 
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country. Column "Median" reports the time series median of tail estimates for each country. 
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for each country and global tail estimate, as well as corresponding t-values. 
     Corr(Country Tail, Global Tail) 
Country AR(1) Mean STD Median Correlation P Value 
Australia 0.81 0.58 0.12 0.55 0.21 <.0001 
Austria 0.73 0.62 0.14 0.60 0.60 <.0001 
Belgium 0.53 0.55 0.10 0.55 0.62 <.0001 
Canada 0.80 0.54 0.08 0.54 0.63 <.0001 
Denmark 0.56 0.58 0.09 0.58 0.23 <.0001 
Finland 0.58 0.47 0.08 0.46 0.56 <.0001 
France 0.90 0.51 0.15 0.55 0.75 <.0001 
Germany 0.87 0.46 0.13 0.44 0.51 <.0001 
Hong Kong 0.70 0.43 0.08 0.42 0.52 <.0001 
Israel 0.70 0.50 0.13 0.48 0.69 <.0001 
Italy 0.86 0.48 0.14 0.43 -0.27 <.0001 
Japan 0.78 0.37 0.06 0.36 0.63 <.0001 
Netherlands 0.53 0.51 0.08 0.50 0.63 <.0001 
New Zealand 0.50 0.67 0.13 0.66 0.23 <.0001 
Norway 0.66 0.53 0.10 0.52 0.26 <.0001 
Portugal 0.48 0.69 0.11 0.68 0.40 <.0001 
Singapore 0.79 0.45 0.12 0.41 0.47 <.0001 
Spain 0.45 0.42 0.07 0.41 0.38 <.0001 
Sweden 0.75 0.55 0.11 0.53 0.54 <.0001 
Switzerland 0.59 0.46 0.08 0.46 0.45 <.0001 
UK 0.47 0.66 0.15 0.66 0.75 <.0001 
US 0.73 0.44 0.05 0.44 0.21 <.0001 
Brazil 0.59 0.55 0.18 0.52 0.39 <.0001 
Chile 0.59 0.66 0.17 0.64 0.50 <.0001 
China 0.20 0.29 0.11 0.28 0.18 0.00 
Czech Republic 0.71 0.48 0.19 0.47 0.36 <.0001 
Egypt 0.63 0.43 0.21 0.44 0.22 0.00 
Greece 0.76 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.39 <.0001 




Table 2 continued       
Country AR(1) Mean STD Median Correlation P Value 
Korea 0.87 0.52 0.20 0.48 0.65 <.0001 
Malaysia 0.72 0.40 0.10 0.39 0.34 <.0001 
Mexico 0.42 0.56 0.13 0.55 0.47 <.0001 
Peru 0.55 1.17 0.47 1.06 0.33 <.0001 
Philippines 0.69 0.59 0.15 0.55 0.46 <.0001 
Poland 0.78 0.46 0.12 0.45 0.58 <.0001 
Russia 0.72 1.16 0.64 0.90 0.30 <.0001 
South Africa 0.57 0.68 0.13 0.68 0.42 <.0001 
Taiwan 0.46 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.34 <.0001 
Thailand 0.77 0.45 0.13 0.47 0.34 <.0001 





Table 3. Predicting Future Market Returns 
This table reports the result of predictive regression of future market return on tail estimates. 
Panel A reports the average of coefficient estimates across all countries, in different 
markets and region groups, with next one month market return used as dependent variable. 
Panel B reports the average of coefficient estimates for countries across all countries, in 
different markets and region groups, with next one year market return used as dependent 
variable.  In Panel A and Panel B, the first two columns report coefficient estimates and 
corresponding t-stats when country tail estimates is used to predict future market returns. 
The third and fourth columns report coefficient estimates and corresponding t-stats when 
global tail estimates is used to predict future market returns. In the last four columns, 
coefficient estimates and corresponding t-stats when both global and local specific tail 
estimates used to predict future market returns. The sample period is from 1980 Jan 1st to 
2014 Dec 31st. 
Panel A. Predicting next one month return 
     Both Tails 
 Country Tail Global Tail Global Tail Local Tail 
EW Coef T Coef T Coef T Coef T 
World 0.03 4.05 0.12 6.86 0.12 6.86 0.02 1.88 
Developed 0.03 2.82 0.08 3.88 0.08 3.88 0.01 0.96 
Emerging 0.04 2.90 0.17 6.56 0.17 6.56 0.02 1.64 
Africa 0.04 3.54 0.24 2.48 0.24 2.48 0.03 2.20 
Asia Pacific 0.04 2.10 0.09 3.82 0.09 3.82 0.03 1.53 
Europe 0.03 2.63 0.13 4.79 0.13 4.79 0.01 0.63 
North America 0.06 2.50 0.08 2.67 0.08 2.67 0.04 1.26 
South America -0.01 -0.34 0.08 3.59 0.08 3.59 -0.02 -0.75 
 
Panel B. Predicting next one year return 
     Both Tails 
 Country Tail Global Tail Global Tail Local Tail 
EW Coef T Coef T Coef T Coef T 
World 0.29 4.94 1.09 7.04 1.09 7.03 0.13 1.67 
Developed 0.25 2.88 0.86 7.23 0.85 7.25 0.06 0.47 
Emerging 0.33 4.47 1.37 4.53 1.37 4.51 0.22 2.39 
Africa 0.58 2.09 2.82 2.11 2.82 2.11 0.41 1.49 
Asia Pacific 0.37 3.53 0.67 4.04 0.67 4.08 0.35 2.20 
Europe 0.21 2.86 1.25 6.82 1.24 6.78 -0.02 -0.20 
North America 0.50 1.71 0.86 2.98 0.86 2.96 0.27 0.68 




Table 4. Long-Short Portfolio Performance 
This table reports performance of long-short value weighted portfolios over time. The 
portfolios are created by sorting stocks' sensitivity to past global tail risks in the market, in 
which the sensitivity is estimated using past 60 month rolling window. Monthly portfolio 
spreads across countries, in different markets and regions are reported, as well as returns 
adjusted using CAPM or 4 factors (market, SMB, HML, and MOM). The sample period is 
from 1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. 
 Raw return spread CAPM adjusted FF4 adjusted 
EW Return T Return T Return T 
World 0.18% 3.90 0.12% 2.82 0.09% 2.14 
Developed 0.18% 3.74 0.12% 2.60 0.09% 1.68 
Emerging 0.17% 1.51 0.11% 1.07 0.09% 1.14 
Africa -0.14% -0.78 -0.22% -1.12 -0.33% -0.99 
Asia Pacific 0.14% 1.71 0.11% 1.36 0.14% 2.46 
Europe 0.23% 2.59 0.13% 1.65 0.07% 0.85 
North America 0.18% 1.46 0.13% 1.15 0.11% 0.77 






Table 5. FM Predictive Regression Results 
This table reports pooled predictive FM regression across countries, markets, or regions. 
On each month in all countries/markets/region, I conduct cross-sectional regression of 
stock return on its past sensitivity to tail risks in the market with control variables 
MKT/SMB/HML/MOM betas, as well as country fixed effect included in the regression 
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rolling window. No control variable is included in model 1. Model 2 includes market betas 
as control variables. Model 3 includes market beta, smb beta, hml beta, and mom beta as 
control variables. The sample period is from 1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. 
 
  Model 1 
Tails 
Model 2 
Tails + Mkt risk 
Model 3 
Tails + FF4 risks 
  Tails Coef T Coef T Coef T 
World Global Tail 0.0017 2.85 0.0014 3.12 0.0013 3.06 
Local Tail 0.0013 3.11 0.0013 3.35 0.0012 3.21 
Developed Global Tail 0.0016 2.19 0.0014 2.56 0.0010 2.28 
Local Tail 0.0012 2.69 0.0012 2.98 0.0010 2.77 
Emerging Global Tail 0.0017 1.55 0.0010 1.06 0.0011 1.14 
Local Tail 0.0036 2.32 0.0034 2.32 0.0029 1.96 
Africa Global Tail 0.0019 1.24 -0.0005 -0.36 -0.0006 -0.34 
Local Tail 0.0073 1.73 0.0067 1.50 0.0036 0.69 
Asia Pacific Global Tail 0.0020 2.82 0.0017 2.62 0.0016 2.59 
Local Tail 0.0010 1.29 0.0007 0.98 -0.0001 -0.16 
Europe Global Tail 0.0017 1.93 0.0012 2.00 0.0008 1.69 
Local Tail -0.0006 -0.64 0.0003 0.36 0.0005 0.64 
North America Global Tail 0.0029 2.53 0.0027 2.84 0.0022 2.83 
Local Tail 0.0021 3.03 0.0022 3.37 0.0021 3.52 
South America Global Tail 0.0030 1.43 0.0019 0.92 0.0027 0.97 





Table 6. Contagion Estimation Results  
This table reports regression results following BEFM2014 model. The dependent variable 
is stock      	
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sensitivity to past global and local specific tails. The factors used are global factors 
constructed following Bekeart, Hodrick and Zhang (2009). In the regression, tail risks used 
are past one month global and local specific tails. Panel A reports results using model based 
on CAPM. Panel B reports results suing model with risk factors of Fama-French 3 factors 
and the momentum factor. The last row in each panel reports the test statistics (ECDIAG) 
for excessive co-movement of model residuals. The sample period is from 1980 Jan 1st to 
2014 Dec 31st. 
Panel A. CAPM 
 
 Interdependence Contagion 
  PARMS T PARMS T 
Market 0.61 9.59 0.29 3.53 
Market*Global Tail 0.42 2.93 1.07 6.02 
Market*Local Tail -0.49 -4.66 -0.35 -3.21 
Market*Crisis   1.83 9.68 
Market*Crisis*Global Tail   -3.90 -9.17 
Market*Crisis*Local Tail   -1.45 -4.85 
Crisis*Global Tail   0.00 -1.47 
Crisis*Local Tail     0.04 2.06 






Table 6 continued 
Panel B. FF4 
 Interdependence Contagion 
  PARMS T PARMS T 
Market 0.70 10.63 0.48 5.64 
Market*Global Tail 0.28 1.90 0.72 3.98 
Market*Local Tail -0.25 -2.71 -0.10 -0.97 
Market*Crisis   0.17 0.32 
Market*Crisis*Global Tail   -0.44 -0.36 
Market*Crisis*Local Tail   -3.74 -3.44 
SMB -0.59 -4.85 -0.45 -3.15 
SMB*Global Tail 0.36 1.41 0.12 0.41 
SMB*Local Tail -0.53 -3.50 -0.73 -4.13 
SMB*Crisis   2.19 1.72 
SMB*Crisis*Global Tail   -6.42 -2.63 
SMB*Crisis*Local Tail   10.40 1.19 
HML 0.47 2.93 0.63 3.85 
HML*Global Tail -0.70 -2.16 -0.97 -2.98 
HML*Local Tail 0.43 2.42 0.30 1.61 
HML*Crisis   5.47 1.63 
HML*Crisis*Global Tail   -13.91 -1.81 
HML*Crisis*Local Tail   8.43 0.59 
MOM 0.02 0.16 -0.08 -0.78 
MOM*Global Tail 0.07 0.34 0.28 1.30 
MOM*Local Tail 0.65 6.46 0.62 6.05 
MOM*Crisis   3.62 2.27 
MOM*Crisis*Global Tail   -10.37 -2.73 
MOM*Crisis*Local Tail   -2.24 -0.36 
Crisis*Global Tail   0.05 4.02 
Crisis*Local Tail     -0.17 -1.53 






Table 7. Contagion by Country During Crisis 
This table reports countries' performance estimated from the pooled regression (for each 
country) Following BEFM2014 model during the crisis period. The dependent variable is 
stock return. The factors used are global and local specific factors constructed following 
Bekeart, Hodrick and Zhang (2009). The tail risks used are past one month global and local 
specific tails. The sample period is from 1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. 
 CAPM FF4 
Country Interdependence Contagion Interdependence Contagion 
Australia -0.06% 0.04% 0.77% -0.01% 
Austria -0.29% -0.01% 0.44% -0.01% 
Belgium -0.32% 0.05% 0.20% 0.00% 
Canada 0.09% 0.05% 0.65% -0.02% 
Denmark -2.47% 0.01% -1.62% 0.01% 
Finland -0.78% 0.05% 0.11% 0.02% 
France -0.39% 0.06% 0.09% 0.01% 
Germany -0.42% 0.05% 0.27% 0.02% 
Hong Kong -1.13% 0.12% -0.09% 0.04% 
Israel -0.10% -0.06% 0.26% -0.02% 
Italy -0.42% -0.02% 0.16% -0.01% 
Japan -0.06% 0.01% 0.53% -0.03% 
Netherlands -0.38% 0.04% -0.02% 0.04% 
New Zealand -1.22% 0.07% -0.67% 0.01% 
Norway -0.34% 0.05% 0.09% 0.00% 
Portugal -0.06% 0.03% 0.52% 0.00% 
Singapore -0.65% 0.13% -0.09% 0.02% 
Spain -0.81% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 
Sweden 0.00% -0.01% 0.39% -0.05% 
Switzerland -0.15% 0.02% 0.33% 0.01% 
UK -1.40% -0.04% -0.88% -0.04% 
US -0.61% -0.07% 0.18% 0.00% 
Brazil 0.61% 0.01% 0.88% -0.03% 
Chile 0.11% 0.05% 0.50% 0.03% 
China 0.65% 0.30% 0.31% -0.03% 
Czech Republic 1.27% -0.03% 1.62% -0.02% 
Egypt 1.09% 0.02% 1.61% -0.01% 
Greece -1.72% 0.08% -1.74% 0.02% 
India -0.09% 0.09% 0.38% 0.06% 
Korea -0.21% 0.01% 0.22% -0.01% 




Table 7 continued     
Country Interdependence Contagion Interdependence Contagion 
Mexico -0.03% -0.03% 0.40% -0.01% 
Peru 0.14% 0.04% 0.49% 0.02% 
Philippines -0.54% 0.06% -0.51% 0.00% 
Poland -0.97% 0.06% -0.69% 0.00% 
Russia -1.68% -0.03% -0.84% -0.02% 
South Africa -0.04% 0.06% 0.54% 0.03% 
Taiwan 0.09% 0.12% 0.59% 0.03% 
Thailand 0.02% 0.11% 0.32% 0.00% 
Turkey 0.84% 0.10% 0.42% 0.02% 







Figure 1. Time Series Plot of US and Global Tail Risks. 
This figure provides time series plot for US and Global Tails during the sample period 
from 1980 Jan 1st to 2014 Dec 31st. Solid line is the plot for global tail risk estimates and 
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